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CIVIL RIGHTS
Anti-Gay Colorado Baker Prevails in Narrow Ruling
Supreme Court fi nds Colorado agency showed “hostility” to religious claims
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
T
he US Supreme Court ruled on June 
4 that overt hostility to religion taint-
ed the decision process at the Colo-
rado Civil Rights Commission when 
it ruled that baker Jack Phillips and his Master-
piece Cakeshop had unlawfully discriminated 
against Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins in 2012 
by refusing to make them a wedding cake.
Writing for the court, Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy reaffi rmed the right of the states to 
ban discrimination because of sexual orienta-
tion by businesses that sell goods and services 
to the public, but insisted that those charged 
with discrimination are entitled to a respect-
ful consideration of their religious beliefs when 
their cases are adjudicated.
Five other members of the court — Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, 
Stephen Breyer, Neil Gorsuch, and Elena Kagan 
— joined Kennedy’s opinion.
The majority’s focus on a fl awed procedure 
at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission sug-
gests this ruling, controversial as it is, may be 
of limited signifi cance in other cases involving 
claims of religious exemption from LGBTQ non-
discrimination protections.
Kennedy found that the Commission failed 
in meeting the requirement that government be 
neutral in matters of religion. During the case’s 
oral argument in December he had signaled this 
concern, making a troubling observation dur-
ing Colorado Solicitor General Frederick Yarg-
er’s defense of the state court’s decision against 
the baker.
 “Counselor, tolerance is essential in a free so-
ciety,” Kennedy said to Yarger. “And tolerance is 
most meaningful when it’s mutual. It seems to 
me that the state in its position here has been 
neither tolerant nor respectful of Mr. Phillips’s 
religious beliefs.”
In his opinion this week, Kennedy, pointing to 
comments made by two Commission members 
at hearings in the case, said, “The Civil Rights 
Commission’s treatment of his case has some 
elements of a clear and impermissible hostility 
toward the sincere religious beliefs that moti-
vated his objection.”
Kennedy continued, “One commissioner sug-
gested that Phillips can believe ‘what he wants 
to believe,’ but cannot act on his religious be-
liefs ‘if he decides to do business in the state.’” 
This commissioner also said, “If a businessman 
wants to do business in the state and he’s got 
an issue with the — the law’s impacting his per-
sonal belief system, he needs to look at being 
able to compromise.” 
At a second hearing, a different commissioner 
talked about how “freedom of religion and reli-
gion has been used to justify all kinds of dis-
crimination throughout history, whether it be 
slavery, whether it be the Holocaust, whether 
it be — I mean, we — we can list hundreds of 
situations where freedom of religion has been 
used to justify discrimination. And to me it is 
one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that 
people can use to — to use their religion to hurt 
others.”
Kennedy found that in making these remarks, 
the two commissioners — who had an obliga-
tion to be neutral — in fact disparaged religion. 
He emphasized that the record of the hearings 
“shows no objection to these comments from 
other commissioners” and that the state Court 
of Appeals ruling affi rming the Commission’s 
decision did not mention them either.
Precedents Cited by Justice Kennedy
Kennedy invoked a 1993 decision in Church 
of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, where 
the Supreme Court held that overtly anti-reli-
gious bias by a Florida legislative body that en-
acted a ban on the ritual slaughter of chickens 
directly aimed at the practices of a minority 
religious sect violated the Constitution’s Free 
Exercise Clause. Even though the law, on its 
face, was neutral with respect to religion and 
so would normally be enforceable against any-
one who engaged in the prohibited practice, the 
court found that the openly stated anti-religious 
sentiments of the legislative sponsors undercut 
the requirement that government be neutral re-
garding religious practices. The only reason the 
municipality had passed the ordinance was to 
forbid ritual slaughter of chickens by members 
of this particular religious sect, the court held, 
and so it was not a neutral law.
Similarly in this case, Kennedy said, evidence 
of hostility to religion by the Commission mem-
bers tainted the process.
Kennedy observed that when the high court 
decided in 2015 that same-sex couples have a 
fundamental right to marry, it had also noted 
that “the First Amendment ensures that reli-
gious organizations and persons are given prop-
er protection as they seek to teach the principles 
that are so fulfi lling and so central to their lives 
and faiths.”
At that time, dissenting Justices Alito and 
Antonin Scalia had emphasized the inevitable 
future clashes as people with religious objec-
tions confronted the reality of same-sex mar-
riages, and Scalia — as was his practice when 
he dissented from Kennedy’s gay rights majority 
opinions — ridiculed Kennedy’s statements for 
falling short of addressing that likelihood.
Kennedy statements in this case do not sug-
gest that religious objectors enjoy a broad ex-
emption from complying with public accommo-
dations laws.
Concurrences from the Left and Right
Kagan fi led a concurring opinion, joined by 
Breyer, generally joining the court’s reasoning 
but disavowing Kennedy’s reliance on evidence 
from a stunt conceived by William Jack, a reli-
gious opponent of same-sex marriage who fi led 
an amicus brief in the case. When he heard 
about the Masterpiece Cakeshop discrimination 
charge, Jack approached three other Colorado 
bakers, asking them to make a cake decorated 
with pictures and Biblical quotations derogatory 
of same-sex marriage and gay people, and all 
three bakers refused his request because they 
found the desired product to be offensive. 
Jack fi led charges of religious discrimination 
against them, but the Colorado Commission 
rejected his charges, fi nding the bakers had a 
right to refuse to make cakes conveying mes-
sages they found offensive. Jack then argued – 
persuasively, in the view of Kennedy, Roberts, 
Alito, and Gorsuch — that the Commission’s 
different treatment of these three bakers com-
pared to Jack Phillips showed its hostility to re-
ligious beliefs. Justice Clarence Thomas, whose 
separate concurring opinion was joined by Gor-
such, also found Jack’s arguments persuasive.
Kagan’s concurrence argued that the case 
involving the three other bakers was distin-
guishable. Jack had asked the bakers to make 
a cake they would have refused to make for any 
customer, regardless of their religion or sexual 
orientation, she pointed out. By contrast, Phil-
lips refused to make a wedding cake he would 
happily have sold to different-sex couples but re-
fused to sell to same-sex couples. 
Gorsuch, in his separate concurrence, in 
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which he was joined by Alito, argued that the 
three bakers were discriminating against Jack 
based on his religious beliefs. He also insisted 
on distinguishing between a cake to “celebrate 
a same-sex marriage” and a generic “wedding 
cake.” 
Interestingly, Kennedy’s opinion focused on 
free exercise of religion and evaded ruling on 
the other main argument advanced by Phillips: 
that requiring him to bake the cake would be 
a form of compelled speech prohibited by the 
First Amendment freedom of speech clause. The 
Trump administration had come into the case 
in support of Phillips’ appeal, but limited its 
argument to the free speech contention, which 
Gorsuch and Thomas embraced in their con-
curring opinions.
Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent, Joined by Jus-
tice Sotomayor
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented in 
an opinion joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, 
minimizing the signifi cance of the statements 
by the two Colorado commissioners. 
“Whatever one may think of the statements 
in historical context,” Ginsburg wrote, “I see no 
reason why the comments of one or two com-
missioners should be taken to overcome Phil-
lips’ refusal to sell a wedding cake to Craig and 
Mullins. The proceedings involved several lay-
ers of independent decisionmaking, of which the 
Commission was but one.”
The state’s Civil Rights Division and an ad-
ministrative law judge considered Craig and 
Mullins’ complaint before it went to the Com-
mission, whose fi nding was upheld by the Colo-
rado Court of Appeals.
“What prejudice infected the determinations 
of the adjudicators in the case before and after 
the Commission?,” Ginsburg wrote. “The Court 
does not say. Phillips’ case is thus far removed 
from the only precedent upon which the Court 
relies, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hi-
aleah, where the government action that violat-
ed a principle of religious neutrality implicated a 
sole decisionmaking body, the city council.”
Ginsburg focused her dissent on a series of 
statements in Kennedy’s opinion that make 
clear that the court’s ruling does not endorse 
some sort of broad exemption for religious from 
complying with anti-discrimination laws, in-
cluding the following:
“It is a general rule that [religious and philo-
sophical] objections do not allow business 
owners and other actors in the economy and 
in society to deny protected persons equal ac-
cess to goods and services under a neutral 
and generally applicable public accommoda-
tions law.”
 “Colorado law can protect gay persons, just 
as it can protect other classes of individuals, 
in acquiring whatever products and services 
they choose on the same terms and condi-
tions as are offered to other members of the 
public.”
“Purveyors of goods and services who object 
to gay marriages for moral and religious rea-
sons [may not] put up signs saying ‘no goods 
or services will be sold if they will be used for 
gay marriages.’”
“[Gay people should not be subjected to] in-
dignities when they seek goods and services 
in an open market.”  
All of these statements, Ginsburg noted, 
“point in the opposite direction” from the majori-
ty’s fi nding that Phillips should win his appeal.
The narrowness and potentially limited prec-
edent established by the ruling were well ex-
pressed by Kennedy, who wrote, “The delicate 
question of when the free exercise of [Phillips’] 
religion must yield to an otherwise valid exer-
cise of state power needed to be determined in 
an adjudication in which religious hostility on 
the part of the State itself would not be a factor 
in the balance the State sought to reach. That 
requirement, however, was not met here. When 
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission consid-
ered this case, it did not do so with the religious 
neutrality that the Constitution requires.”
The Issue of Free Speech
Gorsuch and Thomas would have gone be-
yond the majority opinion to fi nd a violation 
of Phillips’ freedom of speech, as well. On that 
question, Kennedy wrote, “The free speech as-
pect of this case is diffi cult, for few persons who 
have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have 
thought of its creation as an exercise of pro-
tected speech. This is an instructive example, 
however, of the proposition that the application 
of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can 
deepen our understanding of their meaning.” 
He took the issue no further, however. 
What Comes Next
The next shoe to drop, which could bet-
ter clarify the signifi cance of this ruling, may 
come quickly. The high court, also on June 4, 
announced it will discuss a similar case, State 
of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., on June 
7; if the case is accepted for review that would 
likely be announced on June 11.
Arlene’s Flowers refused to provide fl oral ar-
rangements for a same-sex wedding and was 
found by the state civil rights agency and the 
Washington courts to be in violation of its pub-
lic accommodations statute. Arlene’s petition for 
Supreme Court review was fi led last summer, 
but no action was taken by the court pending a 
decision on Masterpiece Cakeshop. If the court 
denies the petition, that would reinforce the view 
that the Masterpiece ruling is narrowly focused 
on the evidence of “hostility to religion” by the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission. 
However, the court might grant the petition 
and send the case back to the Washington 
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of 
Masterpiece. This could respond to Kennedy’s 
observation that the Colorado Court of Appeals 
decision did not even mention the remarks 
made by commissioners that aroused his ire at 
oral argument and were a signifi cant factor in 
the Supreme Court’s decision. A remand to the 
Washington court could implicitly direct that 
court to examine the record for any signs of hos-
tility to religion at any stage in that proceeding.
The Oregon Supreme Court recently heard 
oral argument in a similar wedding cake case, 
Klein d/b/a Sweetcakes by Melissa v. Oregon 
Bureau of Labor and Industries. A ruling by 
the Oregon court could provide the fi rst sign 
of how lower courts will interpret Masterpiece 
Cakeshop. That case was instigated not by the 
same-sex couple denied service but rather by 
the state’s attorney general, reacting to press re-
ports about the denial.
It can be diffi cult to predict what contro-
versial decisions by the Supreme Court might 
mean for future cases. Kennedy spelled out his 
thinking on that, saying, “The outcome of cases 
like this in other circumstances must await fur-
ther elaboration in the courts, all in the context 
of recognizing that these disputes must be re-
solved with tolerance, without undue disrespect 
to sincere religious beliefs, and without subject-
ing gay persons to indignities when they seek 
goods and services in an open market.”
At the oral argument, Phillips and Master-
piece Cakeshop were represented by Kristen K. 
Waggoner of Alliance Defending Freedom, the 
Arizona-based anti-LGBTQ religious advocacy 
fi rm. Trump administration Solicitor General 
Noel J. Francisco made his fi rst appearance be-
fore the court in that post to argue the adminis-
tration’s unavailing freedom of speech position. 
On the other side, David D. Cole, an American 
Civil Liberties Union attorney, arguing on behalf 
of Craig and Mullins, joined Colorado Solicitor 
General Yarger.
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Charlie Craig and David Mullins, whose sexual orientation discrimi-
nation complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop, led to this week’s 
Supreme Court ruling.
